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Abstract
In a visual cryptography scheme a secret image is encoded into n shares, in the form of transparencies. The shares are then
distributed to n participants. Qualified subsets of participants can recover the secret image by superimposing their transparencies.
Non-qualified subsets of participants have no information about the secret image.
In this paper we consider the case when the secret image is a colored image. Most of the previous work on colored visual
cryptography allows the superposition of pixels having the same color assuming that the resulting pixel still has the same color.
This is not what happens in reality since when superimposing two pixels of the same color one gets a darker version of that color,
which effectively is a different color. Superimposing many pixels of the same color might result in a so dark version of the color
that the resulting pixel might not be distinguishable from a black pixel.
In this paper we propose a model where the reconstruction has to guarantee that the reconstructed secret pixel has the exact same
color of the original one and not a darker version of it. We consider (k, n)-threshold schemes where a qualified set of participants
consists of any k participants. We provide a general construction for any k, 2 ≤ k ≤ n and a construction for the special case k = 2.
We also prove lower bounds on the pixel expansion (which is a measure of the goodness of the scheme) for the cases k = 2 and
k = n. The lower bounds match the pixel expansion of the schemes provided in these two cases, thus proving that our schemes
are optimal with respect to the pixel expansion. We also provide an upper bound on the contrast of (k, n)-threshold schemes and
(2, n)-threshold schemes with optimal contrast.
c© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
A visual cryptography scheme (VCS for short) for a set P of n participants is a method to encode a secret
image into n shadow images in the form of transparencies, called shares, where each participant in P receives
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one share. Certain subsets of participants, called qualified sets, can “visually” recover the secret image, but other
subsets of participants, called forbidden sets, have no information on the secret image. A “visual” recovery for a
set X ⊆ P consists of superimposing the shares (transparencies) given to the participants in X . The participants
in a qualified set X will be able to see the secret image without any knowledge of cryptography and without
performing any cryptographic computation. Forbidden sets of participants will have no information on the secret
image.
This cryptographic paradigm was introduced by Naor and Shamir [12]. They analyzed the case of (k, n)-threshold
VCS, in which a black and white (b&w for short) secret image is visible if and only if any k transparencies are stacked
together. It should be noted that the color white is actually the transparent color.
In order to implement a visual cryptography scheme, each pixel of the secret image is subdivided into a certain
number m of subpixels. Hence, there is a loss of resolution proportional to m. The pixel expansion m is the most
important measure of the goodness of a scheme. Obviously, schemes with smaller pixel expansion are better. Optimal
schemes are those that have the minimum pixel expansion. Another important measure for the goodness of a scheme
is the contrast, which is a measure of the quality of the reconstructed image; roughly speaking, the contrast tells us
how much the reconstructed image differs from the original one.
Most of the work done focused on black and white (b&w for short) VCS, where the secret image to be shared is
composed of b&w pixels. There is quite a large body of literature on b&w visual cryptography (see for example [2–4,
6,8,9,12]). Naor and Shamir in their seminal paper [12] provide a construction of b&w (k, k)-threshold schemes with
perfect reconstruction of black pixels whose pixel expansion is 2k−1. We will use such schemes as building blocks in
order to construct our colored VCS.
In this paper we are concerned with colored visual cryptography, where the secret image is made up with a certain
number c of colors. The b&w visual cryptography paradigm is based on the fact that when superimposing pixels the
resulting color is black if any one of the superimposed pixels is black and white if all the superimposed pixels are
white. To be more precise each pixel can be seen as a filter that stops some of the original light. The original light
is perceived by the human eye as white. A black pixel blocks all the light so that the result is a black pixel (no light
left), while a white (transparent) pixel does not stop any light leaving unchanged the original color. When we deal
with colors something similar happens. The difference is that while black and white are the extreme cases (all or no
light blocked), other colors partially block some light. As we discuss more formally in Section 2.1, this means that
when superimposing pixels which are not white, the resulting color becomes darker. The only color that does not alter
the original light is white. For this reason we call white the identity color. For the opposite reason we call black the
annihilator color.
Taking into account the real law of color superposition into colored schemes seems to be quite a challenge and as
far as we know only a few papers do actually use it [11,1,10]. The problem is that superimposing two colors one gets
a third color that might not even be in the original palette of colors. The papers that use a model where different colors
can be superimposed solve the above cited problem by considering only restricted sets of colors which enjoy the nice
property of being closed with respect to the superposition operation. For example the set of colors consisting of white,
black, red, green and blue and the set of colors consisting of white, black, red, green, blue, cyan, yellow and magenta
are closed with respect to color superposition.
Many other papers use a model where the annihilator color is used to cover up the result of a color superposition
that would give a color that is not in the original palette of colors. This can be done either by requiring the special
property that superimposing pixels with different colors one gets black [13], or by ensuring that we have at least one
black pixel in the superposition (e.g. [14,7]). The artificial property used in [13] can be simulated by subdividing each
pixel into c subpixels. However this simulation not only implies a bigger pixel expansion but also a diminishment of
the contrast because when a pixel is reconstructed with the right color, only a fraction of 1/c of the normal pixel size
gets the right color while the remaining fraction of (c − 1)/c becomes black.
Previous work. The papers [13,5,14,7] use a model that is very close to our own. The difference is that those papers
allow pixels of the same color to be superimposed (assuming that the resulting color is still the same one).
Verheul and Van Tilborg [13] provided c-color (k, n)-threshold schemes; the pixel expansion is not given as a
closed formula. In [5] constructions of c-color (2, n)-threshold and (n, n)-threshold schemes are provided and they
both improve on [13].
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The schemes of [13,5] require the special property that superimposing two pixels of different colors one gets black,
which can be implemented paying a loss of resolution of a factor equal to c. In [14,7] such a special property is not
required because the schemes provided in those papers never superimpose pixels with different colors; hence the extra
factor of c in the pixel expansion is avoided.
Yang and Laih [14] provide new constructions for c-color (k, n)-threshold schemes which use as building blocks
schemes for the b&w model. The schemes improve on the pixel expansion of those of [13,5].
In [7] a tight lower bound on the pixel expansion of c-color (n, n)-threshold schemes has been provided. Such a
lower bound is:
m ≥
{
c · 2n−1 − 1, if n is even
c · 2n−1 − c + 1, if n is odd. (1)
It turns out that the (n, n)-threshold schemes of [14] are optimal since they match the above lower bound. In [7]
a construction of (contrast-optimal) c-color (k, n)-threshold scheme is also given and the resulting pixel expansion
improves in some cases the one of [14].
In [7] a construction of c-color (2, n)-threshold scheme is provided. The pixel expansion of such a construction
improves on the other c-color (2, n)-threshold schemes. Unfortunately, also in this case a closed formula for the pixel
expansion is not given.
The above cited papers are the ones that use a model which is the one closest to the model considered in this paper.
Other work on colored visual cryptography is provided in [11,1,10].
This paper. All the papers discussed above use the black color to cover up undesired colors in the reconstructed
image; however the model of [13,14,5,7] requires that the superposition of pixels of the same color gives as a result
that same color. This property is not real, because the result is a darker version of the original color.
In this paper we consider a model where when superimposing pixels we can only superimpose black pixels, white
pixels and at most 1 pixel of a given color. Thus we consider the identity and annihilator color as special colors.
Clearly using this constraint the reconstruction of a color is perfect, in the sense that it gives the exact original color
and not a darker version of it.
Using the above model we build c-color (k, n)-threshold schemes whose pixel expansion is m = c(nk)2k−2.
Clearly our schemes are not comparable with the previous ones, since the model used is different. Our model
requires an extra property so it is not surprising that our pixel expansion is, in general, worst than the corresponding
schemes in the previous models. What is surprising, however, is that for the case of k = n, our c-color (n, n)-threshold
schemes achieve a better pixel expansion. It should be noted that in our definition we have two “special” colors, namely
• and ◦, while in the previous model only • is considered a special color.
For the case k = 2 we also provide an alternative construction achieving pixel expansion m = c(n − 1) improving
on the pixel expansion of the general construction.
For k = 2 and k = n we prove a matching lower bound on the pixel expansion. Hence our schemes are optimal for
k = 2 and k = n.
Finally we prove an upper bound on the contrast of c-color (k, n)-threshold schemes and provide contrast-optimal
schemes for the case k = 2.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a formal definition of the model; the model is justified
by some observations about the real properties of color superposition (Section 2.1). In Section 3, we provide the
construction of c-color (k, n)-threshold schemes and a proof of optimality, with respect to the pixel expansion, for
the case k = n. Section 4 provides the constructions for the case k = 2 and the proof of its optimality. In Section 5
we study contrast-optimal schemes. Finally, Section 6 contains some concluding remarks and directions for future
work.
2. The model
In this section we provide a formal definition of the model considered in this paper. Such a model guarantees an
exact reconstruction of the original pixel color. We start with Section 2.1 by providing the justification for this new
model; then the definition of a VCS is provided in Section 2.2.
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Fig. 1. Example of darkening in color superposition. The original color is a light gray (78, 78, 78).
2.1. Light and colors
Roughly speaking, light is a flux of photons, with each photon having a particular energy (frequency). The energy
of a photon corresponds to the color we see when that photon hits our eyes. The intensity of the light depends on the
number of photons. A white light is a flux of photons of all possible visible frequencies (all colors).
A filter (or the surface of an object) of a particular color C absorbs all of the frequencies except the ones that “make
up” color C , so that, when looking at the light through the filter (or reflected by the surface of the object), we see color
C .
Combining the fundamental colors, which are red, green and blue, and varying their intensity, it is possible to obtain
any other color. So, for our purposes, a color C can be represented by a triple (x, y, z), where x , y and z denote the
amount of red, green and blue, respectively, that color C consists of. Each component of the triple can be considered
as a filter absorbing red, green and blue photons, respectively; the amount of light left is described by an integer in the
range [0, L]. With this setting, we can produce (L + 1)3 different colors, which, for L sufficiently large, are enough
to approximate all colors that the human eye is able to distinguish. Typically, for computers, we have L = 255; for
simplicity we will use L = 100.
The color (0, 0, 0), which we will denote with •, is the black color: indeed all filters are 0 meaning that there
is no light left. The color (100, 100, 100), which we will denote with ◦, is white (transparent) because no light is
absorbed by the filters. The colors red, green and blue are represented, respectively, by (100, 0, 0), (0, 100, 0) and
(0, 0, 100); we will refer to these colors also as R, G and B, respectively. The colors yellow, magenta and cyan are
represented, respectively, by (100, 100, 0), (100, 0, 100) and (0, 100, 100); we will refer to these colors also as Y, M
and C, respectively. The color (50, 0, 0) is also a red, because that is the only component present, but it is darker since
some red light is absorbed. The higher is the value of the component the lighter is the color. If all components are
equal, i.e. (x, x, x), then the resulting color is a gray whose intensity depends on x : the smaller is x , the darker is the
gray.
Let C1 = (x1, y1, z1) and C2 = (x2, y2, z2) be two colors and assume that two pixels of color C1 and of color C2
are printed on two different transparencies. Superimposing the transparencies, one on the top of the other, the resulting
color can be expressed (approximately) as:
add(C1,C2) =
(
int
( x1x2
L
)
, int
( y1y2
L
)
, int
( z1z2
L
))
, (2)
where the int function approximates its argument to the nearest integer. Operator add defines the “color
superposition”. The add operation can naturally be extended to any number of colors. The add operation is
commutative and thus the order in which we superpose the colors is irrelevant. Color ◦ is the “identity” color, in the
sense that for any color C we have that add(C, ◦) = C , while color • is the “annihilator” color, in the sense that for
any color C we have that add(C, •) = •. As expected, we have that add(Y, M) = R, add(R, G) = Y, add(Y, M, C) = •.
Other examples of the result of color superposition are the following: add((80, 80, 80), (80, 80, 80)) = (64, 64, 64),
add((63, 40, 65), (50, 92, 31)) = (31, 37, 20).
Hence superimposing two pixels of the same color one gets a different color. For example consider color (90, 0, 0),
which is an almost full intensity red. If we superimpose two pixels with such a color we get a pixel of color (81, 0, 0).
If we superimpose 5 pixels all with color (90, 0, 0) the resulting pixel has color (59, 0, 0). The difference between
(90, 0, 0) and (59, 0, 0) is quite evident to the human eye. Clearly the more pixels we superimpose the darker the
result will be and thus the recognition of the color might become problematic. Fig. 1 illustrates this situation: on the
left is shown a pixel with color (78, 78, 78), a light gray, then the result of superimposing pixels with that color is
shown. On the far right of the figure is shown the result of superimposing 16 such pixels; the color of the resulting
pixel is hardly distinguishable from black.
S. Cimato et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 374 (2007) 261–276 265
This problem is even more evident if the original color is not very intense as the resulting superposition gets close
to black very quickly. For example superimposing 5 pixels of color (50, 0, 0), which is a half-red, one gets (3, 0, 0)
which is hardly distinguishable from black by the human eye.
Hence in this paper we focus on a model that guarantees the exact reconstruction of the original colors.
2.2. Visual cryptography schemes
A secret image, consisting of colored pixels, has to be shared among a set P = {1, . . . , n} of participants. A trusted
party, which is called the dealer and is not a participant, knows the secret image. The dealer has to distribute shares to
the n participants in the form of printed transparencies. The subsets of P consisting of at least k participants are called
qualified sets. Participants in a qualified subset have to be able to “visually” recover the secret image, by stacking
together their shares (transparencies) and holding the stacked set of transparencies to the light. All other subsets, that
is, those which have less than k participants, are called forbidden sets. Participants in a forbidden set have not to be
able to get any information on the secret image from their shares, neither by stacking together the transparencies nor
by any other computation. Schemes where the forbidden and qualified sets are defined as above are called (k, n)-
threshold schemes. Sometimes more general access structures are used; however in this paper we are concerned only
with (k, n)-threshold schemes.
From now on we concentrate on how to deal with just one pixel of the image. In order to share the entire
image it is enough to repeat the sharing process for each pixel of the image. It should be noted, however, that the
reconstruction depends on the differences among reconstructed pixels which, if different in the original image, should
be distinguishable by the human eye in the reconstructed image.
Each secret pixel is divided intom subpixels. This implies a loss of resolution: the pixels of the reconstructed image
will be m times bigger compared to the ones of the original image. A share is a “version” of the secret pixel consisting
of a particular assignment of colors to the m subpixels.
Each pixel, either in the original image or in the shares, has one of c colors which we denote by {1, 2, . . . , c}. We
augment the set of colors with two special colors: the “annihilator” color black, which we denote with the symbol •,
and the “identity” (transparent) color white, which we denote with the symbol ◦.
We remark that we still have only c colors in the original image; the added black and white colors are needed
to cover up the noise introduced in the reconstructed image in order to not reveal information to forbidden sets of
participants.
Superimposing two pixels one gets a pixel of a color which depends on the color of the superimposed pixels. The
add operator, defined in Equation (2.1), gives the superposition color.
The add operator is easily extended to (column) vectors of colors for which it returns the result of superimposing
all the pixels of the vector. We also extend it to matrices: given a matrix M the add(M) is the (row) vector with
elements in {•, ◦, 1, 2, . . . , c} obtained by letting the i th entry be the add of the i th column of M . We also use a
generalized Hamming weight wi (Ψ) for a vector of colors Ψ , which gives the number of colors in Ψ that are equal
to color i . Notice that w•(Ψ) returns the number of components equal to the special • color (and similarly for ◦).
Given a matrix M and a set X of natural numbers, which represent participants, we denote by M |X the matrix
consisting of only the rows of M corresponding to the integers in X , if they exists in M . For example, assuming that
M has at least 6 rows, if X = {2, 3, 6}, then M |X is the submatrix of M consisting of the second, the third and the
sixth row of M .
Next we provide the definition of a colored visual cryptography scheme.
Definition 2.1. Consider a set of c colors {1, 2, . . . , c} and let h and ` be integers such that 0 ≤ ` < h ≤ m. A c-color
(k, n)-threshold visual cryptography scheme for a set of n participants, consists of c collections (multisets) of n × m
matrices C1, C2, . . . , Cc, whose elements are in the set {◦, •, 1, 2, . . . , c}, satisfying:
1. Given a qualified set X , |X | = k, for any M ∈ Ci , it holds that wi (add(M |X)) ≥ h and w j (add(M |X)) ≤ ` for
any j 6= i .
2. Given a forbidden set X , |X | < k, the c collections of |X | × m matrices, Di , i = 1, 2, . . . , c, consisting of M |X
for each M ∈ Ci , are equal.
3. For any column Ψ in any matrix of any collection we have that w•(Ψ)+ w◦(Ψ) = n − 1.
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To share a secret pixel of color i , the dealer randomly chooses one of the matrices in Ci and distributes row j to
participant j . Thus, the chosen matrix defines the m subpixels in each of the n transparencies.
Since matrices in Ci are used to share pixels of color i we say that i is the primary color for Ci , while any other
color j 6= i is a secondary color for Ci .
Property 1 of Definition 2.1 is called the contrast property because it guarantees that the secret image will be visible
for a qualified set of participants. Property 2 is called the security property because it guarantees that a forbidden set
of participants has no information on the secret image. Property 3 guarantees that the reconstruction of the secret pixel
gives the exact same color as the original secret pixel. Indeed as we have discussed in Section 2, superimposing two
pixels of a given color results in a reconstructed pixel with a darker version of the color. Hence this property makes
sure that we do not superimpose two pixels with the same color.
A measure of how good is the contrast property is given by α = (h−`)/m, and is called the contrast of the scheme.
Notice that the contrast property guarantees the reconstruction only for qualified sets X whose cardinality is exactly
k and not for qualified sets of cardinality greater than k. This is without loss of generality since a qualified set of
participants consisting of more than k members can anyway reconstruct the image by simply using only k shares and
leaving out the remaining ones.
Finally we remark that, although the definition of a VCS is almost identical to that given in [13] and used also in
other papers, the definition differs in that it allows also the use of the identity color ◦, beside the annihilator color •,
and requires an extra property. Moreover our model differs from previous ones because of the underlying rule that
regulates the result of color superposition. In particular while in previous models it is assumed that superimposing
pixels with the same color one gets that color, in our model the superposition of pixels with the same color gives a
darker version of the original color. As we have discussed in Section 2.1, this is what happens in reality.
Base matrices. Given a matrix B we denote by C(B) the set of matrices obtained by permuting in all possible ways
the columns of B. In most schemes, the c collections Ci are obtained by fixing c matrices Bi and letting Ci = C(Bi ).
The matrices Bi are called the “base matrices”. Base matrices constitute an efficient representation of the scheme.
Indeed, the dealer has to store only the base matrices and in order to randomly choose a matrix from C(Bi ) it has to
randomly choose a permutation of the columns of the base matrix Bi .
Notice that the security property for a base matrices scheme is equivalent to: given a forbidden set X , the matrices
Bi |X , for i = 1, 2, . . . , c are the same up to a permutation of the columns.
Notation. Given a scheme S we denote with m(S) the pixel expansion of S, with h(S) and `(S) the thresholds h and
` of S and with α(S) the contrast of S. Given two matrices A and B with the same number of rows, we denote by
A + B the matrix obtained by concatenating the two matrices.
3. c-color (k, n)-threshold schemes
In Section 3.1 we provide a method to construct c-color (k, n)-threshold VCS. In Section 3.2 we prove a lower
bound on the pixel expansion for the case k = n.
3.1. Construction of c-color (k, n)-threshold schemes
The construction uses as a building block a b&w (k − 1, k − 1)-threshold scheme with perfect reconstruction of
black pixels. A black and white scheme with perfect reconstruction of black pixels is a scheme where black pixels of
the original image, are reconstructed with all black subpixels. We remark that the construction we will present works
also when using as building blocks schemes that do not have such a property. We chose to present the construction
with this restriction because it is easier to understand, and what we really care about is the pixel expansion of the
building block scheme. It turns out that the black and white (k, k)-threshold schemes with the best pixel expansion
are schemes with perfect reconstruction of black pixels. So we don’t lose anything by considering only schemes with
perfect reconstruction of black pixels.
For the case of k = 2 one would need a (1, 1)-threshold b&w scheme which, for obvious reasons, is not a scheme.
For the scope of the next construction, we let S•1 = [•] and S◦1 = [◦] be the base matrices of a (1, 1)-threshold scheme.
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Construction 3.1. Fix k and n, 2 ≤ k ≤ n. Let S◦k−1 and S•k−1 be the basis matrices of a (k − 1, k − 1)-threshold
scheme with perfect reconstruction of black pixels and let m′ be the pixel expansion of such a scheme. Denote the rows
of S◦k−1 and S•k−1 with wi and bi , respectively:
S◦k−1 =

w1
w2
...
...
wk−1
 , S•k−1 =

b1
b2
...
...
bk−1
 .
Let Fk,n(i, S
φ
k−1), where i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , c} and φ ∈ {◦, •} be the n ×
(n
k
)
m′ matrix constructed by
(n
k
)
submatrices,
called “blocks”, with dimension n×m′ each consisting of the following rows: n− k (“black”) rows of m′ elements •;
Each block differs from the others in the choice of the n − k “black” rows. The remaining k rows are filled with one
row of elements equal to i followed in order by the k − 1 rows of Sφk−1.
Base matrix for color i , for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , c}, is given by:
Bi = Fk,n(1, S•k−1)+ · · · + Fk,n(i − 1, S•k−1)+ Fk,n(i, S◦k−1)+
Fk,n(i + 1, S•k−1)+ · · · + Fk,n(c, S•k−1).
Some examples will clarify the above construction. Let us start with the case k = n for which the construction
becomes very simple. The matrix Fn,n(i, S◦k−1) consists of only one block: the first row consists of all i’s and the
remaining rows are given by S◦k−1, and similarly for Fn,n( j, S•k−1).
For example consider k = n = 5 and S◦k−1 and S•k−1 given by the Naor and Shamir (4, 4)-threshold scheme [12],
that is
S◦k−1 =

◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦ • • •
◦ ◦ • ◦ • ◦ • •
◦ • ◦ ◦ • • ◦ •
◦ • • • ◦ ◦ ◦ •
 S•k−1 =

◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦ • • •
◦ ◦ • ◦ • ◦ • •
◦ • ◦ ◦ • • ◦ •
• ◦ ◦ ◦ • • • ◦
 .
The following are the base matrices of a 3-color (5, 5)-threshold scheme (the vertical bars identify the F matrices)
obtained with Construction 3.1.
B1 =

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦ • • • ◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦ • • • ◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦ • • •
◦ ◦ • ◦ • ◦ • • ◦ ◦ • ◦ • ◦ • • ◦ ◦ • ◦ • ◦ • •
◦ • ◦ ◦ • • ◦ • ◦ • ◦ ◦ • • ◦ • ◦ • ◦ ◦ • • ◦ •
◦ • • • ◦ ◦ ◦ • • ◦ ◦ ◦ • • • ◦ • ◦ ◦ ◦ • • • ◦

B2 =

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦ • • • ◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦ • • • ◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦ • • •
◦ ◦ • ◦ • ◦ • • ◦ ◦ • ◦ • ◦ • • ◦ ◦ • ◦ • ◦ • •
◦ • ◦ ◦ • • ◦ • ◦ • ◦ ◦ • • ◦ • ◦ • ◦ ◦ • • ◦ •
◦ • • • ◦ ◦ ◦ • • ◦ ◦ ◦ • • • ◦ • ◦ ◦ ◦ • • • ◦

B3 =

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦ • • • ◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦ • • • ◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦ • • •
◦ ◦ • ◦ • ◦ • • ◦ ◦ • ◦ • ◦ • • ◦ ◦ • ◦ • ◦ • •
◦ • ◦ ◦ • • ◦ • ◦ • ◦ ◦ • • ◦ • ◦ • ◦ ◦ • • ◦ •
◦ • • • ◦ ◦ ◦ • • ◦ ◦ ◦ • • • ◦ • ◦ ◦ ◦ • • • ◦

The case of k = n is particularly easy to understand because we only have 1 block and we don’t have to add any
“black” row. So let us now consider another example. Let k = 3 and n = 4 and consider the matrices S◦k−1 and S•k−1
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given by the Naor and Shamir (2, 2)-threshold scheme [12], that is
S◦2 =
[◦ •
◦ •
]
, S•2 =
[◦ •
• ◦
]
.
In this case the F matrices will have
(n
k
) = 4 blocks, since we have to place 1 black row in each of 4 possible positions.
Hence we have:
F3,4(i, S◦2) =

i i i i i i • •
◦ • ◦ • • • i i
◦ • • • ◦ • ◦ •
• • ◦ • ◦ • ◦ •
 , F3,4(i, S•2) =

i i i i i i • •
◦ • ◦ • • • i i
• ◦ • • ◦ • ◦ •
• • • ◦ • ◦ • ◦
 .
The vertical bars identify the 4 blocks. As can be seen each block is given by 1 black row, and the remaining rows
filled, in this order, by one row of i’s and the rows of S◦2 (or S•2 ), from the first to the last. Using the above F matrices
we can build the following 3-color (3, 4)-threshold scheme.
B1 =

1 1 1 1 1 1 • • 2 2 2 2 2 2 • • 3 3 3 3 3 3 • •
◦ • ◦ • • • 1 1 ◦ • ◦ • • • 2 2 ◦ • ◦ • • • 3 3
◦ • • • ◦ • ◦ • • ◦ • • ◦ • ◦ • • ◦ • • ◦ • ◦ •
• • ◦ • ◦ • ◦ • • • • ◦ • ◦ • ◦ • • • ◦ • ◦ • ◦
 ,
B2 =

2 2 2 2 2 2 • • 1 1 1 1 1 1 • • 3 3 3 3 3 3 • •
◦ • ◦ • • • 2 2 ◦ • ◦ • • • 1 1 ◦ • ◦ • • • 3 3
◦ • • • ◦ • ◦ • • ◦ • • ◦ • ◦ • • ◦ • • ◦ • ◦ •
• • ◦ • ◦ • ◦ • • • • ◦ • ◦ • ◦ • • • ◦ • ◦ • ◦
 ,
B3 =

3 3 3 3 3 3 • • 1 1 1 1 1 1 • • 2 2 2 2 2 2 • •
◦ • ◦ • • • 3 3 ◦ • ◦ • • • 1 1 ◦ • ◦ • • • 2 2
◦ • • • ◦ • ◦ • • ◦ • • ◦ • ◦ • • ◦ • • ◦ • ◦ •
• • ◦ • ◦ • ◦ • • • • ◦ • ◦ • ◦ • • • ◦ • ◦ • ◦
 .
We give another example for k = 3, n = 5. Using S◦2 and S•2 given above, we have that
F3,5(i, S◦2) =

i i i i i i • • i i i i • • i i • • • •
◦ • ◦ • • • i i ◦ • • • i i • • i i • •
◦ • • • ◦ • ◦ • • • ◦ • ◦ • • • • • i i
• • ◦ • ◦ • ◦ • • • • • • • ◦ • ◦ • ◦ •
• • • • • • • • ◦ • ◦ • ◦ • ◦ • ◦ • ◦ •
 .
Next we prove that the construction described above is correct.
Lemma 3.2. Construction 3.1 builds a c-color (k, n)-threshold VCS, with pixel expansion m = c(nk)m′, where m′ is
the pixel expansion of the black and white scheme used as building block, and ` = 0, h ≥ 1.
Proof. We start by proving the security property. We observe the following. Each base matrix consists of several
blocks, and by construction there is one similar block per each color (either primary or secondary) with the only
difference that for the primary color the block is made up from rows coming from S◦k−1, while for each secondary
color the block is made up from rows coming from S•k−1. Hence the security property of the new scheme follows
directly from the security property of the (k − 1, k − 1)-threshold scheme given by the matrices S◦k−1 and S•k−1.
Now consider the contrast property. For a qualified set of participants each block for a secondary color contains
either a row with all blacks, or it contains all the k− 1 rows of S•k−1. Recalling that the matrix S•k−1 provides a perfect
reconstruction of the black pixels, in both of the above cases we have that a secondary color is always superimposed
to a black pixel. This implies that ` = 0. For the primary color there will be at least one block that restricted to the
qualified set of participants will consist of one row with the primary color and the remaining k−1 rows given by S◦k−1.
Hence at least one pixel will be superimposed to all white pixels, and thus at least 1 pixel will be of the primary color
(the exact number depends on the black and white scheme that one uses as a building block). Thus we have h ≥ 1.
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Finally the pixel expansion is easily computed observing that the number of blocks in each F matrix is
(n
k
)
and the
width of each block is the same as the pixel expansion m′ of the b&w scheme used as building block. Since there is
one F matrix per each color, the pixel expansion is m = c(nk)m′. 
It is not difficult to see that the above construction works also when the black and white (k − 1, k − 1)-threshold
scheme used as a building block does not reconstruct black pixels in a perfect way. What changes are the resulting
thresholds ` and h.
The best, with respect to the pixel expansion, b&w (k, k)-threshold is the scheme provided in [12]. Such a scheme
is a scheme with perfect reconstruction of black pixels. Hence to build our c-color (k, n)-threshold schemes we use
the b&w (k − 1, k − 1)-threshold scheme by Naor and Shamir whose pixel expansion is m′ = 2k−2.
Hence Construction 3.1 gives a (k, n)-threshold scheme with pixel expansion
m = c
(
n
k
)
2k−2.
We recall that the model used in this paper differs from the ones used in previous work. So, we cannot really
compare schemes given in this paper with previous schemes.
Anyway, we notice that the pixel expansion of our schemes is in general worst than that of previous schemes. This
is not surprising since our model requires an extra property, although it allows the use of two special colors. However
in the case of k = n we also achieve an improvement, with respect to the pixel expansion, over previous schemes. The
pixel expansion of our c-color (n, n)-threshold schemes is c2n−2. This is a factor of 2 better than the lower bound (1).
Hence it is a factor of 2 better than the optimal, with respect to the model of previous papers, c-color (n, n)-threshold
schemes of [14,7].
3.2. Lower bound on the pixel expansion of c-color (n, n)-threshold VCS
In this section we prove that the c-color (n, n)-threshold scheme of Construction 3.1 is optimal with respect to the
pixel expansion. The proof is similar to that used to prove that the Naor and Shamir b&w (n, n)-threshold scheme has
optimal pixel expansion, because it basically argues that such a scheme must be used as a building block in our model.
Lemma 3.3. Any c-color (n, n)-threshold VCS has pixel expansion m ≥ c2n−2.
Proof. We will give a lower bound on the number of columns containing at least one colored pixel. First we observe
that by Property 3 of Definition 2.1, in any matrix M of any collection Ci , each column is composed of 1 colored pixel
and n − 1 black and white pixels.
Fix a color i and consider a matrix M of the collection Ci (recall that all matrices in the collections C have dimension
n × m). Since matrix M reconstructs color i , it must contain at least one column consisting of 1 pixel of color i and
n − 1 white pixels. Without loss of generality, assume that the color is placed on the first row.
In order to satisfy the security property for forbidden sets consisting of n − 1 participants, it is necessary that any
other matrix in any collection C j , with j 6= i , has all the columns that have i on the first row and exactly n − 2 white
pixels, while the remaining one has to be black (indeed if the exact same column appears in all base matrices then it
is useless and can be deleted). This implies that matrix M must contain all the
(n−1
1
)
columns which have a secondary
color on the first row and in the remaining positions have n − 2 white and 1 black. But then reiterating this reasoning
we have that matrix M must contain all the
(n−1
2
)
columns that have i on the first row and in the remaining positions
have n − 3 white and 2 black, and that it must contain all the (n−13 ) columns which have j in the first row and in the
remaining positions have n − 4 white and 3 blacks, and so on.
Hence it follows that matrix M must have at least 2n−2 columns consisting of one row with the primary color i and
the remaining columns which contain all the columns with an even number of black pixels and for each secondary
j color at least 2n−2 columns consisting of one row with the secondary color j and the remaining columns which
contain all the columns with an odd number of black pixels.
Hence matrix M must have at least c2n−2 columns. Since M is an n × m matrix, we have that m ≥ c2n−2. 
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4. c-color (2, n)-threshold VCS with optimal pixel expansion
In this section we present an alternative construction of a (2, n)-threshold scheme that improves on the pixel
expansion. We prove that such a scheme is optimal with respect to the pixel expansion.
Construction 4.1. Fix n ≥ 3. Let Iφn (i), φ ∈ {•, ◦} be a n × n matrix consisting of all non-diagonal elements equal
to φ and all the elements on the diagonal equal to i . Let Fφn (i) the n × (n − 1) matrix consisting of matrix Iφn−1(i) in
the first n − 1 rows and the last row consisting of pixels of color φ. The base matrix for color i is given by
Bi = F•n (1)+ · · · + F•n (i − 1)+ F◦n (i)+ F•n (i + 1)+ · · · + F•n (c).
The following are the base matrices of a 3-color (2, 5)-threshold scheme obtained with Construction 4.1.
B1 =

1 ◦ ◦ ◦ 2 • • • 3 • • •
◦ 1 ◦ ◦ • 2 • • • 3 • •
◦ ◦ 1 ◦ • • 2 • • • 3 •
◦ ◦ ◦ 1 • • • 2 • • • 3
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ • • • • • • • •

B2 =

1 • • • 2 ◦ ◦ ◦ 3 • • •
• 1 • • ◦ 2 ◦ ◦ • 3 • •
• • 1 • ◦ ◦ 2 ◦ • • 3 •
• • • 1 ◦ ◦ ◦ 2 • • • 3
• • • • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ • • • •

B3 =

1 • • • 2 • • • 3 ◦ ◦ ◦
• 1 • • • 2 • • ◦ 3 ◦ ◦
• • 1 • • • 2 • ◦ ◦ 3 ◦
• • • 1 • • • 2 ◦ ◦ ◦ 3
• • • • • • • • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦

Lemma 4.2. Construction 4.1 builds a c-color (2, n)-threshold VCS with pixel expansion m = c(n − 1) and
` = 0, h = 1.
Proof. The security property follows from the fact that, in every base matrix, each row, with the exception of the last
one, consists of 1 colored pixel for each color, exactly n − 1 white pixels and (c − 1)(n − 1) black pixels. Moreover
the last row, in every base matrix, consists of n − 1 white pixels and (c − 1)(n − 1) black pixels. Hence, for each i ,
row i in every base matrix is a permutation of row i in every other base matrix.
The contrast property follows easily by observing that superimposing any two rows of the base matrix for color i
only color i does not overlap with a black pixel while any other pixel with color j 6= i gets superimposed to a black
pixel. Hence superimposing two rows of base matrix Bi , we get at least one pixel of color i and no pixels of any other
color (all remaining pixels are either white or black).
The pixel expansion is c(n − 1) because each base matrix consists of c matrices of dimensions n × (n − 1). 
The next lemma proves that the pixel expansion obtained by Construction 4.1 is optimal. Given a distribution
matrix M ∈ Ci we denote by M( j) the submatrix of M containing columns with one element of color j and the other
elements of colors • or ◦.
Lemma 4.3. In any c-color (2, n)-threshold VCS with optimal pixel expansion we have that
1. In any matrix M ∈ Ci , for each j = 1, 2, . . . , c submatrix M( j) consists of exactly n − 1 columns, each of which
contains j in a different row.
2. The pixel expansion m is lower bounded by c(n − 1).
Proof. Fix a color i and consider a distribution matrix M ∈ Ci . Recall that M is an n×m matrix. Fix a qualified set of
two participants corresponding to rows r1 and r2 of M . It is impossible that color i is absent in both r1 and r2. Indeed
if that were the case the two participants corresponding to r1 and r2 would not reconstruct color i .
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This means that color i can be absent in at most one row of matrix M . Since there are n rows, by Property 3 of
Definition 2.1, the minimum number of columns where i must be present in M is n− 1. Hence M must contain n− 1
columns having color i in n−1 different rows. Such n−1 columns cannot contain any other color (because of Property
3 of Definition 2.1). By the security property every other matrix in C j with j 6= i , must contain such columns. Hence
we have that matrix M , for each color j = 1, 2, . . . , c must contain n − 1 columns with color j , with each pixel of
color j appearing in a different row.
This proves the first assertion. The second part of the lemma follows easily from the first one, since any distribution
matrix must contain, for each color, a submatrix of n − 1 columns. 
By Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3, we have that Construction 4.1 provides a scheme achieving optimal pixel expansion.
Next we prove some properties of the structure of optimal c-color (2, n)-threshold schemes. We show that for any
distribution matrix M ∈ Ci , the submatrix M(i) is “approximately” equal to F◦(i), up to a permutation of the rows
and the columns. In particular the following lemmas provides 3 properties which, roughly speaking, say that for the
distribution matrix of color i , for any two participants, the number of reconstructed pixels of color i must be at least
one more than the number of reconstructed pixels of color j for any j 6= i . Since the properties are formulated in
terms of 2× 2 submatrices of the base matrices, they basically say that any 2× 2 submatrix of a base matrix for color
i of an optimal scheme must have the same structure of the corresponding submatrix in the base matrix for color i of
the scheme of Construction 4.1. More formally:
Lemma 4.4. In a c-color (2, n)-threshold scheme with optimal pixel expansion the following properties are satisfied:
1. For any distribution matrix M ∈ Ci , and qualified set X of 2 participants, the submatrix M(i)|X, stripped of the
columns with only • and ◦, cannot be
[
i •
• i
]
nor
[• i
i •
]
.
2. For any distribution matrix M ∈ Ci , and qualified set X of 2 participants, if the submatrix M(i)|X, stripped of the
columns with only • and ◦, is equal (up to a permutation of the columns) to
[
i ◦
◦ i
]
, then the submatrix M( j)|X, for
any j 6= i , stripped of the columns with only • and ◦, cannot be
[
j ◦
◦ j
]
nor
[◦ j
j ◦
]
.
3. For any distribution matrix M ∈ Ci , and qualified set X of 2 participants, if the submatrix M(i)|X, stripped of the
columns with only • and ◦, is equal (up to a permutation of the columns) to
[
i •
◦ i
]
, or to
[
i ◦
• i
]
, then the submatrix
M( j)|X, for any j 6= i , stripped of the columns with only • and ◦, must be equal to
[
j •
• j
]
or to
[• j
j •
]
.
Proof. In the following all the equalities between matrices have to be considered up to a permutation of the columns.
We start by proving Property 1. Fix a distribution matrix M ∈ Ci and a qualified set X of 2 participants, and
consider the submatrix A equal to M(i)|X stripped of the columns with only • and ◦. Since pixels of color i can only
be reconstructed with the subpixels of A it cannot be the case that A is equal to
[
i •
• i
]
, otherwise the qualified set X
would not be able to reconstruct the original pixel.
Next we prove Properties 2 and 3. Fix a distribution matrix M ∈ Ci and a qualified set X of 2 participants, and
consider the submatrices A and B equal to, respectively, M(i)|X and M( j)|X , stripped of the columns with only •
and ◦.
If A =
[
i ◦
◦ i
]
, then participants in X reconstruct two pixels of color i . By the contrast property participants in X
can reconstruct at most 1 pixels of any other color j , so B cannot be equal to
[
j ◦
◦ j
]
, which gives Property 2.
If A =
[
i •
◦ i
]
or A =
[
i ◦
• i
]
, then participants in X reconstruct only one pixel of color i . By the contrast property
participants in X must not reconstruct pixels of any other color j , so B must be equal to
[
j •
• j
]
. 
5. Contrast-optimal c-color (2, n)-threshold VCS
In this section we study contrast-optimal c-color (k, n)-threshold VCS. We first provide an upper bound on the
contrast of (k, n)-threshold schemes. Then for the case of k = 2 we provide a construction of schemes achieving
optimal contrast.
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5.1. Upper bound on the contrast of c-color (k, n)-threshold VCS
In order to find an upper bound on the contrast we consider a particular set of schemes, which we call canonical.
We show that for any given scheme there exists a corresponding canonical scheme with the same contrast. This means
that an upper bound on the best contrast for canonical schemes is also an upper bound for the best contrast of all the
schemes.
Define f ij (q) as the number of columns of base matrix B
i having a pixel of color j in row q. A scheme is called
canonical when f ij (q) is constant with respect to i, j and q. Thus for a canonical scheme S we can define the
multiplicity f (S) = f ij (q), for any i, j and q .
We start by observing that restricting our attention only to schemes that can be expressed with base matrices is
without loss of generality. Indeed given any c-color (k, n)-threshold scheme, as proved in [2,7], it is possible to
construct a base matrix scheme with the same contrast. Such a base matrix scheme can be easily constructed by first
constructing a scheme whose collections Ci have the same cardinality (this can be done by duplicating each matrix of
collection Ci a number of times equal to the least common multiple of the cardinalities of the collections C divided by
the cardinality of Ci ) and then taking as base matrix for color i the matrix consisting of the concatenation of all the
distribution matrices in Ci . Hence we restrict our attention to base matrix schemes.
The next two lemmas prove that we can always find a canonical scheme with the same contrast of any c-color
(k, n)-threshold scheme. Lemma 5.1 gives a transformation that makes f ij (q) independent of q while Lemma 5.2
gives another transformation that makes f ij (q) independent of j . The independence from i derives from the security
property.
Lemma 5.1. Let S be a c-color (k, n)-threshold scheme. There exists a base matrices c-color (k, n)-threshold scheme
S ′, such that α(S) = α(S ′) and, for every i and j , f ij (1) = f ij (2) = · · · = f ij (n).
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that scheme S is a base matrices scheme. Let C1,C2, . . . ,Cc, be the
base matrices of scheme S. Let pi1, pi2, . . . , pin! be all the possible permutations of the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. Let piz(C j )
be the matrix C j obtained by permuting its rows according to the permutation piz .
Construct a new scheme S ′ having the following base matrices: Bi = pi1(C i )+ pi2(C i )+ · · · + pin!(C i ).
Hence in the new scheme base matrix Bi is basically obtained by concatenating n! copies of base matrix C i , where
each copy differs from the others because the rows of C i are listed in a different permutation.
Scheme S ′ satisfies the contrast property. Indeed, for any qualified set of participants X , we have that:
1. wi (add(Bi |X)) ≥ h′ where h′ = n! · h(S), because each matrix piz(C i ) satisfies, by definition,
wi (add(piz(C i )|X)) ≥ h(S);
2. For j 6= i , w j (add(Bi |X)) ≤ `′ where `′ = n! · `(S) because each matrix piz(C i ) satisfies, by definition,
w j (add(piz(C i )|X)) ≤ `(S).
Scheme S ′ satisfies the security property. Indeed, let X be a forbidden set of participants. Let j ′ and j ′′ be two
colors. We have that B j
′ |X = pi1(C j ′)|X + pi2(C j ′)|X + · · · + pi(C j ′)|X and B j ′′ |X = pi1(C j ′′)|X + pi2(C j ′′)|X +
· · · + pin!(C j ′′)|X . For the security property of S, for all z = 1, 2, . . . n!, matrices piz(C j ′)|X and piz(C j ′′)|X are the
same up to a permutation of the columns. Hence matrices B j
′ |X and B j ′′ |X , for any j ′ and j ′′, are the same up to a
permutation of the columns. Thus, the security property holds also for S ′.
We have that
α(S ′) = h(S
′)− `(S ′)
m(S ′) =
n! · h(S)− n! · `(S)
n! · m(S) = α(S
′).
Finally, fix i and j , and denote with f (q) and f ′(q), the parameters f ij (q) for S and S ′, respectively. By the
construction we have that, for any q , f ′(q) = ∑n`=0(n − 1)! · f (`), which is constant with respect to q. Hence
f ′(1) = f ′(2) = · · · = f ′(n). 
In the next lemma we will use the following transformation, which we call a canonical transformation.
First we recall another transformation (used in [7]) which simply consists of renaming the colors according to
a given permutation σ . We call such a transformation a σ -color transformation. Given a permutation σ defined
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over the set of colors {1, 2, . . . , c} (we let σ(◦) = ◦ and σ(•) = •), a σ -color transformation of a c-color (k, n)-
threshold scheme S with base matrices C1,C2, . . . ,Cc, is a new scheme S ′ obtained by changing C i into C iσ where
the transformation is obtained by applying σ to every element of C i . It is not hard to see that scheme S ′ is a new
scheme for the set of colors {σ(1), σ (2), . . . , σ (c)}. Moreover scheme S′ is such that m(S ′) = m(S), h(S ′) = h(S)
and `(S ′) = `(S). (The proof is based on the fact that the transformation only renames the colors, without changing
anything in the actual scheme. A formal proof can be found in [7].)
Using the σ -color transformation we now define the canonical transformation. Let S be a c-color (k, n)-threshold
VCS with base matrices C1,C2, . . . ,Cc. Let σ1, σ2, . . . , σc! be all the possible permutations of the set of colors
{1, 2, . . . , c}. (We also let σz(◦) = ◦ and σz(•) = •.) Denote by C iσz the base matrix for color i in the scheme obtained
with the σz-color transformation of S. The canonical transformation of scheme S defines a new scheme S ′ by letting,
for each i = 1, 2, . . . , c. base matrix Bi be
Bi = Cσ
−1
1 (i)
σ1 + Cσ
−1
2 (i)
σ2 + · · · + C
σ−1c! (i)
σc! .
An example will clarify the canonical transformation. Consider a 3-color (2, 2)-threshold scheme S with base
matrices:
C1 =
[
1 ◦ 2 • 3 • 1
◦ 1 • 2 • 3 •
]
,
C2 =
[
1 • 2 ◦ 3 • 1
• 1 ◦ 2 • 3 •
]
,
C3 =
[
1 • 2 • 3 ◦ 1
• 1 • 2 ◦ 3 •
]
.
Let σ1 = (1, 2, 3), σ2 = (1, 3, 2), σ3 = (2, 1, 3), σ4 = (2, 3, 1), σ5 = (3, 1, 2), σ6 = (3, 2, 1) we have that
C
σ−11 (1)
σ1 = C1σ1 =
[
1 ◦ 2 • 3 • 1
◦ 1 • 2 • 3 •
]
, C
σ−12 (1)
σ2 = C1σ2 =
[
1 ◦ 3 • 2 • 1
◦ 1 • 3 • 2 •
]
,
C
σ−13 (1)
σ3 = C2σ3 =
[
2 • 1 ◦ 3 • 2
• 2 ◦ 1 • 3 •
]
, C
σ−14 (1)
σ4 = C3σ4 =
[
2 • 3 • 1 ◦ 2
• 2 • 3 ◦ 1 •
]
,
C
σ−15 (1)
σ5 = C2σ5 =
[
3 • 1 ◦ 2 • 3
• 3 ◦ 1 • 2 •
]
, C
σ−16 (1)
σ6 = C3σ6 =
[
3 • 2 • 1 ◦ 3
• 3 • 2 ◦ 1 •
]
.
Thus, the base matrix of the scheme obtained after the canonical transformation are:
B1 =
[
1 ◦ 2 • 3 • 1 1 ◦ 3 • 2 • 1 2 • 1 ◦ 3 • 2
◦ 1 • 2 • 3 • ◦ 1 • 3 • 2 • • 2 ◦ 1 • 3 •
]
+
[
2 • 3 • 1 ◦ 2 3 • 1 ◦ 2 • 3 3 • 2 • 1 ◦ 3
• 2 • 3 ◦ 1 • • 3 ◦ 1 • 2 • • 3 • 2 ◦ 1 •
]
B2 =
[
1 • 2 ◦ 3 • 1 1 • 3 • 2 ◦ 1 2 ◦ 1 • 3 • 2
• 1 ◦ 2 • 3 • • 1 • 3 ◦ 2 • ◦ 2 • 1 • 3 •
]
+
[
2 ◦ 3 • 1 • 2 3 • 1 • 2 ◦ 3 3 • 2 ◦ 1 • 3
◦ 2 • 3 • 1 • • 3 • 1 ◦ 2 • • 3 ◦ 2 • 1 •
]
B3 =
[
1 • 2 • 3 ◦ 1 1 • 3 ◦ 2 • 1 2 • 1 • 3 ◦ 2
• 1 • 2 ◦ 3 • • 1 ◦ 3 • 2 • • 2 • 1 ◦ 3 •
]
+
[
2 • 3 ◦ 1 • 2 3 ◦ 1 • 2 • 3 3 ◦ 2 • 1 • 3
• 2 ◦ 3 • 1 • ◦ 3 • 1 • 2 • ◦ 3 • 2 • 1 •
]
Lemma 5.2. Let S be a c-color (k, n)-threshold scheme. There exists a canonical c-color (k, n)-threshold scheme S ′,
such that α(S) = α(S ′).
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Proof. By Lemma 5.1 we can assume, without loss of generality, that scheme S is a base matrices scheme such that,
in any base matrix Bi , for any fixed color j , we have that f ij (q) is constant with respect to q.
Let S ′ be the scheme obtained by applying the canonical transformation to S. Observe that by the σ -color
transformation each matrix C
σ−1z (i)
σz used in the canonical transformation, is a base matrix for color i for a scheme
having h = h(S), ` = `(S) and m = m(S). Using this observation, we can prove that scheme S ′ satisfies the contrast
property. Indeed, for any qualified set of participants X , we have that:
1. wi (add(Bi |X)) ≥ h′ where h′ = c! · h(S), because each matrix Cσ
−1
z (i)
σz satisfies, by definition,
wi (add(C
σ−1z (i)
σz |X)) ≥ h(S);
2. For j 6= i , w j (add(Bi |X)) ≤ `′ where `′ = c! · `(S) because each matrix Cσ
−1
z (i)
σz satisfies, by definition,
w j (add(C
σ−1z (i)
σz |X)) ≤ `(S).
Scheme S ′ satisfies the security property. Indeed, let X be a forbidden set of participants. Let j ′ and j ′′ be two
colors. We have that B j
′ |X = C j ′σ1 |X + C j
′
σ2 |X + · · · + C j
′
σc! |X and B j ′′ |X = C j
′′
σ1 |X + C j
′′
σ2 |X + · · · + C j
′′
σc! |X . For
the security property of S, for all z = 1, 2, . . . , c!, matrices C j ′σz |X and C j
′′
σz |X are the same up to a permutation of the
columns. Hence matrices B j
′ |X and B j ′′ |X , for any j ′ and j ′′, are the same up to a permutation of the columns. Thus
the security property holds also for S ′.
We have that
α(S ′) = h(S
′)− `(S ′)
m(S ′) =
c! · h(S)− c! · `(S)
c! · m(S) = α(S
′).
To complete the proof, we need to prove that f ij (q) is constant. We already know that it is constant with respect to
q for S. The canonical transformation keeps the independence from q since it simply concatenates (base) matrices for
which the independence from q holds.
We now argue that it is constant also with respect to j . This property follows from the construction. Indeed what
the construction does is to permute the colors in all possible ways so that each color appears the same number of times
as any other color.
Finally we observe that f ij (q) must be constant with respect to i because of the security property: indeed if we
look at any fixed row (one participant) we must not be able to distinguish the base matrices, which means that the c
rows of the c base matrices must be equal up to a permutation of the color. Hence f ij (q)must be constant with respect
to i . 
Lemma 5.3. Any c-color (k, n)-threshold scheme has contrast α ≤ kcn .
Proof. Let S be a c-color (k, n)-threshold scheme. By Lemma 5.2 there exists a canonical c-color (k, n)-threshold
scheme S ′ such that α(S ′) = α(S).
Let B1, B2, . . . , Bc be the base matrices of S ′ and f (S ′) be the multiplicity of S ′.
Fix a color i , and consider base matrix Bi . Since f (S ′) gives, for each color j the number of times that color j
appears in any given row of any base matrix, we have that any base matrix must have a number of columns m which
satisfies m ≥ ∑cj=1∑nq=1 f (S ′) = c · n · f (S ′). Consider now any qualified set consisting of k rows r1, r2, . . . , rk .
Clearly the number of subpixels of color i that we can reconstruct is at most f ii (r1)+ f ii (r2)+· · ·+ f ii (rk) = k f (S ′).
Thus the contrast α(S ′) is at most k f (S ′)/m. Since m ≥ c · n · f (S ′) we have that the α(S ′) ≤ k/(cn). Finally we
recall that α(S) = α(S ′), hence we have the lemma. 
5.2. A contrast-optimal (2, n)-threshold scheme
We next provide a construction for c-color (2, n)-threshold schemes with maximal contrast.
Construction 5.4. Fix n ≥ 2. Recall that Iφn (i), φ ∈ {•, ◦} is a n × n matrix consisting of all non-diagonal elements
equal to φ and all the elements on the diagonal equal to i .
Bi = I •n (1)+ · · · + I •n (i − 1)+ I ◦n (i)+ I •n (i + 1)+ · · · + I •n (c).
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The following are the base matrices of a 3-color (2, 4)-threshold scheme obtained with Construction 5.4.
B1 =

1 ◦ ◦ ◦ 2 • • • 3 • • •
◦ 1 ◦ ◦ • 2 • • • 3 • •
◦ ◦ 1 ◦ • • 2 • • • 3 •
◦ ◦ ◦ 1 • • • 2 • • • 3

B2 =

1 • • • 2 ◦ ◦ ◦ 3 • • •
• 1 • • ◦ 2 ◦ ◦ • 3 • •
• • 1 • ◦ ◦ 2 ◦ • • 3 •
• • • 1 ◦ ◦ ◦ 2 • • • 3

B3 =

1 • • • 2 • • • 3 ◦ ◦ ◦
• 1 • • • 2 • • ◦ 3 ◦ ◦
• • 1 • • • 2 • ◦ ◦ 3 ◦
• • • 1 • • • 2 ◦ ◦ ◦ 3

Lemma 5.5. Construction 5.4 builds a c-color (2, n)-threshold VCS with pixel expansion m = cn and ` = 0, h = 2.
Proof. The security property follows from the fact that each row consists of 1 colored pixel for each color, exactly
n− 1 white pixels and (c− 1)(n− 1) black pixels. Hence each row in every base matrix is a permutation of any other
row in any other base matrix.
The contrast property follows easily by observing that superimposing any two rows of the base matrix for color i
only color i does not overlap with a black pixel while any other pixel with color j 6= i gets superimposed to a black
pixel. Hence superimposing two rows of base matrix Bi , we get two pixels of color i and no pixels of any other color
(all remaining pixels are either white or black).
The pixel expansion is cn because each base matrix consists of c matrices of dimensions n × n. 
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have considered a new model for colored visual cryptography. Compared with previously used
models our model requires an additional property, namely, that the reconstruction of the secret pixel must preserve the
original color.
We have provided a construction for a c-color (k, n)-threshold scheme, for any number of colors c, and for any
value of k, n, with 2 ≤ k ≤ n.
We prove that our c-color (n, n)-threshold schemes are optimal with respect to the pixel expansion. We also provide
a different construction for c-color (2, n)-threshold schemes and prove that such a construction gives schemes with
optimal pixel expansion. It remains open the problem of finding schemes with optimal pixel expansion for 2 < k < n.
We have also considered schemes with optimal contrast providing an upper bound for (k, n)-threshold schemes
and a contrast-optimal scheme for the case k = 2. It would be interesting to find schemes with optimal contrast for
k > 2.
The model considered in this paper stems from the observation that superimposing pixels of the same color one
gets a darker version of that color, and thus, especially when superimposing many pixels, the reconstructed color can
get very close, and thus indistinguishable, from the black color, which is usually used to make the scheme secure
and is always present in the reconstruction. In a more general model one can consider the real properties of color
superposition. As far as we know very few papers have tried this approach [11,1,10] and in all cases the schemes work
for restricted sets of colors. An interesting direction of research would be to provide schemes that better exploit the
real properties of color superposition.
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